Recent methods have adapted the well-established AGM and belief base frameworks for belief change to cover belief revision in logic programs. In this study here, we present two new sets of belief change operators for logic programs. They focus on preserving the explicit relationships expressed in the rules of a program, a feature that is missing in purely semantic approaches that consider programs only in their entirety. In particular, operators of the latter class fail to satisfy preservation and support, two important properties for belief change in logic programs required to ensure intuitive results.
INTRODUCTION
A key ingredient for any machine to be considered "artificially intelligent" is a system to represent and reason about knowledge in the application domain of interest (McCarthy 1958) . In analogy to a human brain, such a system should be capable of storing information in some knowledge base and reasoning over existing information to deduce new information. Moreover, information in a knowledge base should be amenable to change, whether it be adding, deleting, or modifying information. The study of belief change (Doyle 1979; Fagin et al. 1983; Gärdenfors 1988; Hansson 1999; Harper 1976; Levi 1980) concerns itself exactly with these kinds of dynamics in knowledge bases. It aims at providing mechanisms to change a knowledge base whenever new information is acquired. The majority of these mechanisms rely on two fundamental principles: the principle of primacy of new information, stating that new information should be treated with priority over existing information in the knowledge base, and the principle of minimal change, stating that as much existing information as possible should be preserved during a change operation (Dalal 1988 ).
An important endeavour to guide change operations on a knowledge base and by now the most widely adopted belief change paradigm is the so-called AGM framework, named after the initials of the author trio (Alchourrón et al. 1985) . It classifies the possible changes to a knowledge base as expansion, revision, and contraction operations. In an expansion, new information is incorporated into a knowledge base, regardless of any inconsistencies that may arise. A revision operation also incorporates new information into a knowledge base, but in such a way that the resulting knowledge base is consistent. This is achieved by discarding some existing information. During a contraction, no new information is added to a knowledge base but some existing information is removed from it. On the one hand, the framework provides a set of postulates that each rational change operator should satisfy, and, on the other hand, defines specific constructions of expansion, revision, and contraction that satisfy these criteria. While the underlying assumption of the AGM framework is that any information implied by a knowledge base is represented explicitly in the knowledge base, the belief base framework of belief change (Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1989; Rott 1992) does not require this assumption. Postulates and constructions for expansion, revision, and contraction operators in the belief base framework have been defined to complement those from the AGM model (Hansson (1999) provides a summary).
While the AGM and belief base frameworks have been applied to a variety of knowledge representation formalisms (an overview is given by Wassermann (2011) ), work on an adaptation to knowledge representation in the form of logic programs (Colmerauer and Roussel 1996; Kowalski 1974; Lloyd 1987) has been slow to progress. A major challenge in the adaptation of the AGM and belief base frameworks to logic programming lies in the semantics of logic programs. While the frameworks and their previous adaptations are based on monotonic semantics, the standard answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988 ) of logic programs is nonmonotonic. Only recently have operators been proposed for belief revision in logic programs. Program-level revision (Delgrande 2010) and screened semi-revision (Krümpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012) are initial approaches to logic program revision, yet they have strict limitations in their expressiveness due to the nonmonotonicity of the underlying answer set semantics. A breakthrough arrived with the distance-based approach to logic program revision, which rests upon characterising an agent's beliefs in terms of the set of strong equivalence (SE) models (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Turner 2003 ) of a logic program. A logic program P has the same set of SE models as a program Q if and only if, for any program R, the answer sets of P combined with R are exactly the same as the answer sets of Q combined with R. SE models are a refinement of answer sets and classic models as they provide more information about the atoms in a program and their dependencies. SE model semantics provides an alternative, monotonic characterisation for logic programs and thus circumvents obstacles presented by nonmonotonicity. To revise a program P by a program Q, the distance-based revision operator determines those SE models from the set of SE models of Q that are closest to the SE models of P.
Even though the distance-based approach is a major milestone for logic program revision, it has some critical shortcomings. First, as it relies on the set of SE models of an entire program as the representation of beliefs expressed by the program, it operates on the program-level only. This means that a program may freely be substituted with any other that has the same set of SE models and the revision output will remain the same. However, the information expressed by a program is more than just its set of SE models-a program also encodes relationships between the atoms occurring in it Leite and Pereira (1998) . Such relationships are expressed on the rule-level, by the individual rules contained in a program. By neglecting information expressed on the rule-level, the distance-based approach fails to satisfy the property of preservation (Inoue and Sakama 2004) and the property of support (Inoue and Sakama 2004; Slota and Leite 2013) . This leads to some highly unintuitive results, as illustrated by the following two examples:
It is the 31st of December and I plan to drive from San Jose to San Francisco to see the New Year fireworks. Due to previous experience I believe that the city will hold the fireworks unless there is fog. Today's weather pattern looks similar to the last days', when there was heavy fog in San Francisco. So I believe that it will be foggy again today. I decide to check the weather forecast nonetheless, which says that there will be no fog tonight in San Francisco. Since I trust the forecast more than my own meteorological skills, I have to revise my beliefs. By employing the distance-based revision method, I would end up believing that it will not be foggy, while being undecided whether the fireworks will be held. Formally, let P 1 = { f oд., fireworks ← not fog. } and Q 1 = { ⊥ ← f oд. }. Then, the distancebased revision of P 1 by Q 1 would return { ⊥ ← f oд. }.
I drive from San Jose to San Francisco every morning for work. I can use the 101 highway or the 280 freeway, but neither is particularly quicker. However, I believe that if there are roadworks on the 101, then the 280 is quicker. I was told by a friend that there are roadworks on the 101 currently, so I have been travelling on the 280. Now I hear on the radio that the roadworks finished and revise my beliefs. Using the distance-based revision method, I would end up with the belief that there are no roadworks on the 101, while still keeping the belief that the 280 is quicker. Formally, let P 2 = { 101_roadworks., 280_quicker ← 101_roadworks. } and Q 2 = { ⊥ ← 101_roadworks. }. Then, the distance-based revision of P 2 by Q 2 would return { ⊥ ← 101_roadworks., 280_quicker . }.
The first example demonstrates that the distance-based approach does not satisfy the preservation property. I do not conclude that the fireworks will be held, even though I now believe that it will not be foggy. The revision operation simply disregards the second rule of P 1 , which expresses the relationship between fog and fireworks. The reason for this is that the set of SE models of the first rule of P 1 is a proper subset of the set of SE models of the second rule. Thus, the set of SE models of P 1 is exactly the set of SE models of the first rule, which means that the second rule is invisible in the program-level view. The second example demonstrates that the distance-based approach does not satisfy the support property. I keep believing that the 280 is quicker, although the grounds to believe so do not hold any longer. The problem is that the dependency relationship between 280_quicker and 101_roadworks is captured on the rule-level, by the set of SE models of the second rule of P 2 , but not on the program-level, by the set of SE models of the entire program P 2 .
A second shortcoming is that the distance-based approach makes the definition of a corresponding contraction operator difficult to come by. In classical logic, contraction can be defined in terms of revision by using the negation of a sentence. However, in logic programs we do not have the luxury of negation of a program. A workaround could be to use the complement of the set of SE models of the contracting program Q and select from this set the SE models that are closest to the ones of the initial program P. Yet, such a method may return SE models that are somewhat unrelated to P or Q, especially when the complement consists of a large number of SE models.
These drawbacks are not unique to the distance-based approach. Any semantic revision operator working only on the program-level is essentially syntax-independent and thus cannot satisfy support or preservation. Furthermore, even though SE models are strictly more expressive than answer sets, as they encode more information in each model, they are not sufficient to guarantee satisfaction of support or preservation by a semantic revision operator that is built upon them. In particular, despite representation theorems Schwind and Inoue 2016) stating that semantic revision operators built upon SE models satisfy all AGM revision postulates and that such operators are exactly characterised by these postulates plus some additional ones, the characterisation is not strong enough to enforce support or preservation. This is due to the fact that the characterisation allows too many possible candidates for the outcome of a semantic revision (Schwind and Inoue 2016) .
The motivation for this work is to address these limitations of purely semantic revision operators. In particular, we propose here, on the one hand, revision operators that take into account information expressed by a program on the program-level and the rule-level to avoid such unintuitive results as just shown. However, we present corresponding contraction operators with similar properties. We also look beyond the standard set of postulates used so far, to characterise the properties of our operators. The main contributions of this work can be summarised as follows.
-We provide new translations of the AGM and belief base revision and contraction postulates to the logic programming setting and establish formal relationships between these postulates and to previous translations. -We introduce two sets of belief change operators for logic programs-partial meet revision and contraction operators and ensconcement revision and contraction operators-and show that each operator satisfies the relevant belief base revision or contraction postulates as well as the majority of AGM revision or contraction postulates. We also demonstrate that our partial meet and ensconcement revision operators address the shortcomings of the distancebased approach to logic program revision and that they are generalisations of the screened semi-revision approach for logic programs. -We establish that our ensconcement operators are generalisations of our partial meet operators and that the Levi and Harper identities hold for our operators. We further show that the outcome of a revision or contraction operation remains unaffected whether an ensconcement is defined over rules or subsets of a program. -We connect our results to the classic belief change frameworks by showing that our operators possess similar properties as their counterparts in propositional logic, that they conform fully to the belief base framework, and that they align more closely to the AGM and belief base frameworks than the distance-based revision operators.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. We first provide the preliminaries in Section 2 and review related work in Section 3. We then present new translations of the AGM and belief base revision and contraction postulates to logic programs in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we propose partial meet and ensconcement belief change operators for logic programs, respectively, and we evaluate their suitability with respect to the relevant postulates and existing operators. We establish the formal relationships between our operators in Section 7. We finally discuss our findings in relation to the classic belief change frameworks in Section 8 and conclude with a summary in Section 9. Preliminary results from Section 5 were presented in a conference paper (Binnewies et al. 2015) .
PRELIMINARIES
We first briefly recall syntax and semantics of logic programs and then review the foundations of belief change.
Logic Programming
Let A be a finite vocabulary of propositional atoms. A rule r over A has the form
(1)
Here, all a i , b i , c i , d i ∈ A and k, l, m, n ≥ 0. The operators "not," ";," and "," stand for default negation, disjunction, and conjunction, respectively. For convenience, let H + (r ) = {a 1 , . . . , a k },
If k = 1 and l = m = n = 0, then r is called a fact, and we omit "←"; if k = l = 0, then r is a constraint, and we denote the empty disjunction by ⊥. A (generalised) logic program is a finite set of rules of the form of Equation (1). We write LP A for the class of all logic programs that can be constructed from A. An interpretation Y ⊆ A satisfies a program P, denoted by Y |= P, if and only if (iff) it is a model of all rules under the standard definition for propositional logic such that each rule represents a conditional and default negation is transcribed to classical negation. Let Mod
An answer set (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988 ) of a program P is any subset-minimal interpretation Y that satisfies the reduct of P with respect to Y , denoted by P Y and defined as
The set of all answer sets of P is denoted by AS (P ).
An SE interpretation is a tuple (X , Y ) of interpretations with X ⊆ Y ⊆ A. We usually write, e.g., (ab, ab) instead of ({a, b}, {a, b}) for legibility. Let SE be the set of all SE interpretations over A. For any set S of SE interpretations, by S, we denote the complement of S with respect to SE, that is, S = SE \ S. An SE interpretation (X , Y ) is an SE model (Turner 2003 ) of a program P iff Y |= P and X |= P Y . The set of all SE models of P is denoted by SE(P ) and P is satisfiable iff SE(P ) ∅. An interpretation Y is an answer set of P iff (Y , Y ) ∈ SE(P ) and, for any X ⊂ Y , (X , Y ) SE(P ). Often, we drop explicit set notation for rules and their union, e.g., for rules r , r ∈ P, we use SE(r ) to denote SE({r }) and write SE(r ∪ r ) instead of SE({r } ∪ {r }). Note that SE(P ) = r ∈P SE(r ). Given two programs P and Q, we say that P is strongly equivalent (Lifschitz et al. 2001 ) to Q, denoted by P ≡ s Q, iff SE(P ) = SE(Q ), and P implies Q, denoted by P |= s Q, iff SE(P ) ⊆ SE (Q ) . In the particular case of SE(P ) ⊂ SE(Q ), we say that P strictly implies Q. The relation |= s is antitonic with respect to the program subset relation, i.e., Q ⊆ P implies P |= s Q. Furthermore, we write |= s P to express SE(P ) = SE.
SE models are a refinement of answer sets and classic models as they provide more information about the atoms in a program and their dependencies. For example, each of the following programs P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 9 over A = {a, b} has {∅} as the only answer set but the sets of SE models are different for each program: (a, a) , (∅, ab) , (a, ab) , (ab, ab)}, (b, b) , (∅, ab), (b, ab) , (ab, ab)}, (a, a) , (∅, b) , (b, b) (a, a) , (∅, ab) , (a, ab) , (b, ab) , (ab, ab)}, (b, b) , (∅, ab) , (a, ab) , (b, ab) , (ab, ab)}, (a, a) , (a, ab) , (ab, ab)}, (b, b) , (b, ab) , (ab, ab)}.
The consistency under SE semantics is also different from that under answer set semantics. Consider the logic program P = { a ← not a. } over A = {a}. It has the SE models SE(P ) = {(∅, a), (a, a) } but no answer set at all, in other words, P is satisfiable under SE semantics but not under answer set semantics. Informally, we can interpret the content of an SE model (X , Y ) on a three-valued scale. Any atoms in X are true, any atoms not in Y are false, and any atoms in Y but not in X are undefined.
Belief Change
The AGM framework (Alchourrón et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988) In the AGM framework, a belief state is modelled as a belief set, defined as a set of sentences from some logic-based language L that is closed under logical consequence, i.e., when all beliefs implied by a knowledge base are explicitly represented in the knowledge base. Let K be a belief set, ϕ and ψ sentences, K ⊥ denote the inconsistent belief set, and Cn(·) stand for a logical consequence function. By ϕ ≡ ψ , we mean Cn(ϕ) = Cn(ψ ). The expansion of K by ϕ, written K ⊕ ϕ, is defined as K ⊕ ϕ = Cn(K ∪ {ϕ}). The AGM framework provides a set of postulates that any rational revision operator should satisfy. The postulates are listed as follows, where represents a revision operator:
( 1) requires that the outcome of a revision is a belief set. ( 2) states that the revising sentence is contained in the revised belief set. ( 3) asserts that a belief set revised by a sentence is always a subset of the belief set expanded by that sentence. ( 3) and ( 4) together state that revision coincides with expansion in cases when the revising sentence is consistent with the initial belief set. ( 5) guarantees that a revision outcome is consistent, unless the revising sentence is logically impossible. ( 6) ensures that logically equivalent sentences lead to the same revision outcomes. ( 7) and ( 8) together enforce K to be minimally changed in a revision by both ϕ and ψ , such that the outcome is the same as the expansion of K ϕ by ψ , provided that ψ is consistent with K ϕ.
In the concrete case that a belief state is represented as a finite set of propositional formulas, the following set of postulates is equivalent to the set ( 1)-( 8) (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) . Let ϕ,ψ , μ be propositional formulas:
( 1KM) requires that the revising formula can be derived from the revision outcome. ( 2KM) specifies that revision corresponds to conjunction whenever the revising formula is consistent with the formula to be revised. ( 3KM) guarantees consistency of a revision outcome whenever the revising formula is consistent. ( 4KM) states that revising logically equivalent formulas by logically equivalent formulas leads to logically equivalent results. ( 5KM) and ( 6KM) together stipulate that the revision by a conjunction leads to the same outcome as revising by one conjunct and then forming the conjunction with the other conjunct, provided that the conjunction thus formed is satisfiable.
The AGM framework also provides a set of postulates that any rational contraction operator should satisfy. The postulates are given below, where represents a contraction operator:
( 1) requires that the outcome of a contraction is a belief set.
( 2) ensures that no new beliefs are introduced during a contraction. ( 3) stipulates that the belief set remains unchanged during a contraction operation whenever the sentence to be contracted is not contained in it. ( 4) states that a contracting sentence is not a logical consequence of the contracted belief set, unless the sentence is a tautology. ( 5) requires that the original belief set can be recovered by expanding a contracted belief set by the sentence that was contracted. ( 6) ensures that logically equivalent sentences lead to the same contraction outcomes. ( 7) guarantees that any beliefs retained in a contraction by ϕ and in a contraction by ψ are also retained in a contraction by both ϕ and ψ . ( 8) specifies that any beliefs retained in a contraction by both ϕ and ψ are also retained in a contraction by ϕ, whenever ϕ itself is not retained. For belief states represented as propositional formulas, a set of seven postulates to characterise rational contraction operations, that is equivalent to the set ( 1)-( 8), has been proposed (Caridroit et al. 2017) .
The appropriateness of the Recovery postulate ( 5) within this set of contraction postulates has been discussed intensively (Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1991; Makinson 1987; Nayak 1994; Niederée 1991) . To replace the Recovery postulate in expressing that no beliefs should be retracted unduly during a contraction operation, alternative postulates were proposed. Hansson (1991) offered the following postulate:
( 5r) If ψ ∈ K \ (K ϕ), then there is a set K such that K ϕ ⊆ K ⊂ K and ϕ Cn(K ) but ϕ ∈ Cn(K ∪ {ψ }).
The Relevance postulate ( 5r) states that a sentence ψ should only be removed during the contraction of a sentence ϕ from K if ψ is relevant for implying ϕ. In the presence of ( 1)-( 3), ( 5) is equivalent to ( 5r) in propositional logic (Hansson 1991) . More recently, Fermé et al. (2008) presented the following Disjunctive Elimination postulate ( 5de):
According to ( 5de), a sentenceψ should only be removed during the contraction of a sentence ϕ from K if the contraction result does not imply the disjuntion of ϕ and ψ . In the presence of ( 2)-( 3), ( 5r) is equivalent to ( 5de) in propositional logic (Fermé et al. 2008) .
One of the classic constructions to implement belief change is partial meet contraction (Alchourrón et al. 1985) , which we recapitulate here. A set K is a remainder set of a set K ⊆ L with respect to a sentence ϕ iff
The set of all remainder sets of K with respect to ϕ is denoted by K⊥ϕ. A selection function γ for a belief set K is a function such that (i) if K⊥ϕ ∅, then ∅ γ (K⊥ϕ) ⊆ K⊥ϕ and (ii) γ (K⊥ϕ) = {K }, otherwise. A partial meet contraction operator γ for K is defined as: K γ ϕ = γ (K⊥ϕ). The following representation theorem shows that the set of postulates ( 1)-( 6) exactly characterises the class of partial meet contraction operators.
Theorem 2.1. Alchourrón et al. (1985) For any belief set K, γ is a partial meet contraction operator for K iff γ satisfies ( 1)-( 6).
By placing further restrictions on the selection function, the representation theorem can be extended to the full set of postulates. A transitively relational selection function γ for K is determined by a transitive relation over 2 K such that γ (K⊥ϕ) = { K ∈ K⊥ϕ | K K for all K ∈ K⊥ϕ }. A partial meet contraction operator γ determined by a transitively relational selection function γ is called a transitively relational partial meet contraction operator.
Theorem 2.2. Alchourrón et al. (1985) For any belief set K, γ is a transitively relational partial meet contraction operator for K iff γ satisfies ( 1)-( 8).
A corresponding (transitively relational) partial meet revision operator γ ( γ ) that satisfies ( 1)-( 6) (( 1)-( 8)) can be obtained from a (transitively relational) partial meet contraction operator via the Levi identity: K ϕ = (K ¬ϕ) ⊕ ϕ (Gärdenfors 1981; Levi 1977) . The inverse identity, which constructs a contraction operator from a revision operator, is due to Harper (1976) :
While the AGM approach provides an effective framework to conduct belief change, the representation of belief states in the form of belief sets has some shortcomings (see Hansson (1999) for a detailed discussion). From a practical perspective, main drawbacks of belief sets are that they are generally large objects, since all logical consequences of all beliefs are contained, and that it is impossible to distinguish between inconsistent belief sets, as inconsistent belief sets consist of the entire language. Belief bases (Fuhrmann 1991; Hansson 1989; Rott 1992) are an alternative representation of belief states. A belief base is a set of sentences from L that is not necessarily closed under logical consequence.
Hansson (1993) defined a partial meet base contraction operator − γ for a belief base B as B − γ ϕ = γ (B⊥ϕ) and showed that the following set of postulates exactly characterises the class of partial meet base contraction operators: Hansson (1993) For any belief base B, − γ is a partial meet base contraction operator for B iff − γ satisfies (−1)-(−4).
Note that (−1), (−2), and (−3) in the belief base setting correspond directly to ( 2), ( 4), and ( 5r) in the AGM setting, respectively. (−4) states that if any parts of B, which imply ϕ also imply ψ , then the same parts of B will be retained in a contraction by ϕ as in a contraction by ψ .
He also defined a corresponding partial meet base revision operator γ for a belief base B as B γ ϕ = (B − γ ¬ϕ) ∪ {ϕ} and showed that the following set of postulates exactly characterises the class of partial meet base revision operators:
Theorem 2.4. Hansson (1993) For any belief base B, γ is a partial meet base revision operator for B iff γ satisfies ( 1)-( 5).
The pendants to ( 1) and ( 2) in the AGM framework are ( 2) and ( 3), respectively. ( 3) requiresψ to only be removed from B if it would otherwise make the revision outcome inconsistent.
( 4) mandates that if any parts of B, which are consistent with ϕ are also consistent with ψ , then the same parts of B will be retained in a revision by ϕ as in a revision by ψ . ( 5) is a weaker version of ( 5). Williams (1994) proposed further belief change operators for belief bases, which rely on an ordering over the sentences contained in a belief base, called ensconcement. An ensconcement associated with a belief base B is any total preorder on B that satisfies the following conditions:
A sentence ψ is at least as ensconced as a sentence ϕ iff ϕ ψ , and ψ is strictly more ensconced than ϕ iff ϕ ≺ ψ . Condition ( 1) states that sentences that are strictly more ensconced than a sentence ϕ do not entail ϕ. Condition ( 2) requires any tautologies in the belief base to be most ensconced. The proper cut of B for ϕ is cut
An ensconcement contraction operator satisfies (−1), (−2), and Postulates (−5), (−6), and (−8) correspond directly to ( 3), ( 6), and ( 5de) in the AGM setting, respectively. (−7) states that a contraction by a conjuntion is the result of contracting by the first of the conjuncts, the result of contracting by the second of the conjuncts, or the common part of these two results. In the belief base framework, the relationship between (−3) and (−8) is different to the one between ( 5r) and ( 5de) in the AGM framework: (−3) implies (−8) but not vice versa (Fermé et al. 2008) .
RELATED WORK
One of the key developments for adapting the AGM framework of belief change to logic programs came with the distance-based approach to logic program revision . It is built on the monotonic SE semantics for logic programs and understands a belief state as the set of SE models of a program. In that work, the formula-based revision postulates ( 1KM)-( 6KM) are translated to logic programs as follows, where a revision operator * is a function from LP A × LP A to LP A and the expansion of P by Q, denoted P Q, is understood as
The approach adapts two revision operators from classic belief change to logic programs, namely, Dalal's revision operator (Dalal 1988 ) and Satoh's revision operator (Satoh 1988) . Informally, to revise a program P by a program Q, the operators return those SE models from the set of SE models of Q that are closest to the SE models of P, where closeness is determined by Dalal's or Satoh's notion of distance. identified that the adaptation of Satoh's revision operator gives more intuitive results than the adaptation of Dalal's revision operator, so we will focus on the former here. This restriction has no effect on our later discussions.
We briefly restate the definition and main result of the distance-based approach. Let Δ stand for the symmetric difference between two sets X , Y , that is,
For any two sets E, E , let
Definition 3.1 ). Let P, Q ∈ LP A . The revision of P by Q, denoted P Q, is defined as P Q = R such that R ∈ LP A and SE(R) = SE (Q ) if SE(P ) = ∅, and otherwise,
Theorem 3.1 ). The revision operator satisfies ( * 1m)-( * 5m).
The distance-based approach was extended by two representation theorems Schwind and Inoue 2016) , stating that any logic program revision operator satisfying ( * 1m)-( * 6m) plus some additional conditions can be characterised by some preorder over a set of SE models or classical interpretations, respectively.
Besides the distance-based approach, few other methods for logic program revision have been proposed. The screened semi-revision approach for logic programs (Krümpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012) is based on answer set semantics and aligns itself with the belief base framework. The approach assumes a belief state to be the set of rules belonging to a program and combines adaptations of the constructions of semi-revision (Hansson 1997) and screened revision (Makinson 1997 ) into a screened consolidation operation for logic programs. The consolidation operator first finds all maximal subsets of one program that are consistent with a second program under answer set semantics, then selects exactly one of these subsets, and returns this subset together with the second program as the outcome.
We review the formal definitions of the screened consolidation operator and the main result here. Let P ∈ LP A and Q ⊆ P. The set of screened remainder sets of P with respect to Q is
A maxichoice selection function γ P for P is a function such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
Definition 3.2 (Krümpelmann and Kern-Isberner (2012) ). Let P, Q ∈ LP A and γ P be a maxichoice selection function for P. A screened consolidation operator ! γ P for P is defined as P! γ P Q = γ P (P⊥ ! Q ).
The authors propose the following adaptation of partial meet base revision postulates that any screened consolidation operator ! should satisfy, where ! is a function from LP A × LP A to LP A , and show that ! γ P is exactly characterised by these postulates. (2012)). For any P ∈ LP A , ! γ P is a screened consolidation operator for P iff ! γ P satisfies (!1)-(!5).
The program-level approach to logic program revision (Delgrande 2010 ) is also based on answer set semantics and assumes the beliefs that make up a belief state to be the answer sets of a program. The revision operation relies on extending the standard answer set semantics to three-valued answer set semantics for determining the outcome. To revise a program P by a program Q, for each three-valued answer set X of Q, all maximal subsets R of P are selected such that X is a subset of each three-valued answer set X of R ∪ Q. The revision operation returns a set of answer sets that correspond to each X as the result. In the author's view, the AGM revision postulates ( 3), ( 4), ( 7), and ( 8) are inappropriate in the context of nonmonotonic semantics. An adaptation of the remaining postulates is fulfilled by the revision operation.
The work of Zhuang et al. (2016) concerns itself with the revision of a disjunctive logic program by another. The authors observed that for a belief revision operator in a nonmonotonic setting, the task of inconsistency resolving can be done not only by removing old beliefs but also by adding new beliefs. Based on this observation, they proposed a variant of partial meet revision. For resolving the inconsistency between the original and the new beliefs, the variant obtains not only maximal subsets of the initial program that are consistent with the new one but also minimal supersets of the initial program that are consistent with the new one. A representation theorem is provided. Since the idea of resolving inconsistency by adding new beliefs is beyond the classic AGM approach, some extra postulates are required to characterise the variant. Inoue and Sakama (2004) argue that neither the set of answer sets nor the set of SE models of a program provide enough detail to revise a program. They illustrate that while two programs { a., b ← not a. } and { a. } have the same set of SE models, and thus the same set of answer sets, they should be treated differently during a revision operation, since b should be derived from the first program whenever the rule a. is discarded. We call this property preservation here, defined formally as follows.
The authors further argue that revision operations should distinguish between two programs { a., b. } and { a., b ← a. }. While these two programs again share the same set of SE models, they too should not be interchangeable, since after a removal of the rule a., b should not be derived from the latter program any more. This property has become known as support (Slota and Leite 2013), defined formally as follows.
To address these two issues, Inoue and Sakama (2004) introduced a new notion of program equivalence that is stricter than strong equivalence, called C-update equivalence: any two programs P 1 , P 2 ∈ LP A are C-update equivalent iff P 1 \ P 2 ≡ s P 2 \ P 1 .
A relative of belief revision is belief update (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992) . The difference between these two is usually understood in the way that belief revision addresses changes to a belief state brought about by some new information about a static world, whereas belief update covers changes to a belief state due to dynamics in the world described by the belief state. Similar to belief revision, the belief update framework prescribes a set of postulates that each rational update operator should satisfy and provides a construction that complies with it. A number of update operators for logic programs have been proposed, which differ greatly in the degree of alignment to the classic belief update framework. On the whole, these approaches rely predominantly on syntactic transformations of programs and return a set of answer sets instead of an updated program as the outcome. The landscape of update operators has already been reviewed exhaustively in other places, for example, detailed overviews are given by Delgrande et al. (2004) and Slota (2012) . Of interest in the current context is the exception-based update approach (Slota and Leite 2012), which introduces RE (robust equivalence) models as an extension of SE models. An RE model of a program P is any SE interpretation (X , Y ) such that X |= P Y . The authors regard a belief state as the collection of the sets of RE models of the rules in a program. In the update operation, exceptions in the form of RE models are added to those sets of RE models of the initial program that are incompatible with the RE models of the updating program. Incompatibilities between two sets of RE models are determined by differences in the truth values of atoms occurring in both sets. The update operator satisfies the majority of the update postulates adapted to logic programs.
An ordered logic program is a tuple (P, <) such that P is a logic program and < is a preference ordering over the rules in P. Thus, it is conceivable to express the revision of P by Q as (P ∪ Q, <), where < is some appropriate preference ordering on P ∪ Q (from Delgrande et al. (2007) , for example), and employ one of the different semantics proposed (Brewka and Eiter 1999; Delgrande et al. 2003; Schaub and Wang 2003) to obtain the preferred answer sets of this ordered logic program. An ordered logic program can be transformed into a standard logic program, so that the preferred answer sets of the former are exactly the answer sets of the latter (Delgrande et al. 2003 ). Yet, the transformed program may bear no syntactic relation to the original program. More importantly, an ordered logic program (P ∪ Q, <) may be inconsistent, i.e., may have no answer sets, even if P and Q themselves are consistent (Delgrande et al. 2004 ). These characteristics make ordered logic programs rather unsuitable as a methodology for logic program belief change in general.
ADAPTING THE BELIEF CHANGE FRAMEWORKS
Before we set out to define new constructions of logic program belief change, we translate the ideas of the classic belief change frameworks to the logic programming setting. We assume that a belief state is represented in the form of a program from LP A and new information to expand/ revise/contract this program comes in the form of another program from LP A . Even though a consequence relation for logic programs under SE semantics exists (Eiter et al. 2004; Wong 2008) , logic programs are per se not closed under logical consequence. Thus, it seems natural to align logic program belief change with the belief base framework. However, as the majority of previous approaches to logic program revision have focussed on adapting the AGM framework, we will consider it here as well to enable us to draw proper comparisons.
As pointed out above, in the case of propositional knowledge bases the set of formula-based revision postulates ( 1KM)-( 6KM) is equivalent to the set ( 1)-( 8). However, in the context of logic programs, it is worth having a closer look at the relationship between these two sets. Besides adaptations for the purpose of logic program "update" operations under answer set semantics (Eiter et al. 2002) or N 2 logic (Osorio and Cuevas 2007) , we find that postulates for logic program revision have usually been built on the formula-based revision postulates ( 1KM)-( 6KM) until now Schwind and Inoue 2016) . They are given in the form of ( * 1m)-( * 6m) (see Section 3). We will now present a new set of postulates for logic program revision operators, based on the original AGM postulates ( 1)-( 8), and then explain their relationship to ( * 1m)-( * 6m). We will discover that the equivalence of the two sets of postulates under propositional logic does not carry over to logic programs, that, in fact, the adaptation of ( 1)-( 8) to logic programs leads to postulates that are in most cases stricter than ( * 1m)-( * 6m), since Q ⊆ P implies P |= s Q but the converse does not hold.
Let P, Q, R ∈ LP A and a revision operator * be a function from LP A × LP A to LP A . In the following, we understand expansion, denoted by the operator +, as P + Q = P ∪ Q:
As we expect the output of any logic program revision to be a logic program represented in the same language as the input programs, ( * 1) is a basic but nonetheless crucial condition, which is included in previous translations by the requirement that * is a function from LP A × LP A to LP A . ( * 2) stipulates that the revising program is always included in a revision outcome and is a stronger version of ( * 1m), since ( * 2) implies ( * 1m) but not vice versa. ( * 2) thus captures that new information, encoded in the revising program, has primacy over old information, encoded in the initial program. Further, we require in ( * 3) that a revision outcome never contains elements not in P or Q, to avoid introducing irrelevant information. This condition is covered by previous adaptations only for the case that P + Q is satisfiable in ( * 2m). Together, ( * 3) and ( * 4) state that revision coincides with expansion if P + Q is satisfiable, so that we do not remove information unnecessarily in that case. Thus, ( * 3) and ( * 4) imply ( * 2m) but not vice versa. ( * 5) is the stricter, biconditional version of ( * 3m), emphasising that consistency of the revision outcome is directly dependent on the consistency of the revising program. We also expect reliability of a revision operator given similar inputs. ( * 6) guarantees that revision by strongly equivalent programs leads to strongly equivalent results. Unlike belief sets, logic programs are not closed under logical consequence, so that we cannot expect from two different bodies of information that are merely strongly equivalent to be equal after a revision. Thus, the consequent is translated as "P * Q ≡ s P * R" from the original postulate ( 6). ( * 4m) is stricter than ( * 6). ( * 7) and ( * 8) capture the intention of changing the initial program minimally by requiring that the revision of P by the expansion of Q with R has the same outcome as P * Q expanded with R, whenever the latter is satisfiable. ( * 7) and ( * 8) imply ( * 5m) and ( * 6m) but not vice versa, respectively.
A translation of the AGM contraction postulates to logic programs is listed below, where P, Q, R ∈ LP A and a contraction operator .
− is a function from LP A × LP A to LP A :
Similar to revision, we expect the output of any logic program contraction to be a logic program represented in the same language as the input programs, as formalised in ( . −1). Next, we require that contraction is an operation that eliminates some rules from the initial program and introduces no new ones, so ( .
−2) states that the contraction outcome is a subset of the initial program. According to ( . −3), if the beliefs to be contracted are not implied by the initial belief state, then nothing is to be retracted, so that information is not removed unnecessarily. Furthermore, as the input program to the contraction operator determines which beliefs should be removed from the initial program, ( . −4) requires that the beliefs represented by the input program are not implied by the contracted belief state, unless they are tautologies. To allow a reversal of the contraction operation, ( . −5) states that all parts of the initial program P that are discarded in a contraction by Q can be recovered by a subsequent expansion with Q. As for revision, we expect reliability also of a contraction operator given similar inputs. ( . −6) ensures that contraction by strongly equivalent programs leads to the same outcomes. Finally, whenever we contract by a combination of two programs, then it is enough to contract by either one. This means, on the one hand, that we want the beliefs retained in the contraction by both programs individually also to be retained in the contraction by their expansion. Therefore, ( . −7) demands that any parts retained in both P . − Q and P .
− R are also retained in P . − (Q + R). On the other hand, we expect that any beliefs removed from the initial program, through contracting by one of the programs in the combination, are also removed when contracting by the combination. So, whenever Q is not implied by the result of a contraction by Q + R, then ( . −8) states that this result is also retained in a contraction by Q alone.
are direct translations of ( 1), ( 2), ( 5), ( 6), and ( 7), respectively. In the adaptation of ( 3) to ( .
−3), we use "P |= s Q" instead of "Q P." Belief sets are closed under logical consequence, which means K ϕ iff ϕ ∈ K, so that either can be used as the condition in ( 3). However, for logic programs under SE semantics, we can conclude P |= s Q from Q ⊆ P but not Q ⊆ P from P |= s Q. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use "P |= s Q" than "Q P,"as P |= s Q implies Q P. For the same reason is "P .
. We now adapt the belief base revision postulates ( 1)-( 5) to logic programs, where again P, Q, R ∈ LP A and a revision operator * is a function from LP A × LP A to LP A :
All five postulates are direct translations of ( 1)-( 5). We have ( * 1b) = ( * 2) and ( * 2b) = ( * 3). The principle of retaining as much information as possible from the initial program during a revision is expressed by ( * 3b). The postulate requires a rule r to be removed during a revision of P by Q if r contributes to making P irreconcilable with Q. ( * 4b) captures our expectation of reliability given similar inputs. It states that if all subsets of P that agree with Q also agree with R, then the same elements of P will be retained in a revision by Q as in a revision by R. ( * 5b) guarantees satisfiability of the revision result whenever the revising program itself is satisfiable. ( * 4b) is a stronger version of ( * 6) and ( * 5b) is a weaker version of ( * 5).
Finally, we translate the belief base contraction postulates (−1)-(−8) to logic programs, where P, Q, R ∈ LP A and a contraction operator .
These postulates are direct translations of (−1)-(−8). We have ( .
) requires a rule r to only be removed during the contraction of P by Q if r somehow contributes to implying Q. ( . −4b) states that if exactly those subsets of P that do not imply Q also do not imply R, then the same elements of P will be retained in a contraction by Q as in a contraction by R. As for revision, ( . −4b) is again a stronger version of ( . −6). Since it is sufficient to contract by either program when faced with a contraction by an expansion of two programs, ( . −7b) specifies that a contraction by two programs is the outcome of contracting the first program, the outcome of contracting the second program, or the intersection of these two outcomes. ( . −8b) stipulates that r should only be removed if the contracted program has at least one SE model that is not an SE model of Q or r .
Both ( . −3b) and ( . −8b) express that we want to retain as much information as possible from the initial program during a contraction. While the postulates ( 5r) and ( 5de) are equivalent in the presence of certain other postulates in the AGM framework for propositional logic, the postulates ( . −3b) and ( . −8b) for logic programs are not equivalent. Rather, their relationship is hierarchical, similar as in the belief base framework. Satisfaction of ( . −3b) implies satisfaction of ( . −8b) but not vice versa.
The other direction does not hold as evidenced later by Example 6.7. The Levi identity (Gärdenfors 1981; Levi 1977) We adapted the AGM and belief base postulates to logic programs in such a way that the revising or contracting beliefs are entire programs, not just individual rules. We have thus essentially defined conditions for what is known in classic belief change as choice contraction (Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994) and revision. In a choice contraction, a set of sentences may be contracted by either a single sentence or a set of sentences, for example, K {ϕ,ψ }. Yet, since adapting the postulates that exactly characterise partial meet choice contractions would yield the postulates ( . −1b)-( . −3b) and ( . −6b), we do not have to pursue this distinction here further.
PARTIAL MEET BELIEF CHANGE
Inspired by our motivation, we begin in this section with defining belief change operators for logic programs that preserve syntactic information, to take into account information on the programlevel as well as on the rule-level. We first adapt the idea of a partial meet construction from classic belief change and formulate revision and contraction operators for logic programs. We utilise the translations of the AGM and belief base revision and contraction postulates from the previous section to test the rationality of our operators.
Partial Meet Revision
As the basis for our construction of partial meet revision, we define a compatible set of some program with respect to another program as the dual of a remainder set (Alchourrón et al. 1985) .
Definition 5.1 (Compatible Set). Let P, Q ∈ LP A . The set of compatible sets of P with respect to Q is
Each compatible set is a maximal subset of P that is consistent with Q under SE semantics. Each is thus a candidate to be returned together with Q as the outcome of a revision. To determine exactly which candidate(s) to choose, we employ a selection function. In the classic case, a selection function for a belief set is defined only over a set of remainder sets of that belief set (see Section 2.2). Since we plan to use our selection function for different types of sets, we define it freely with respect to an arbitrary set as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Selection Function). A selection function γ for a set S is a mapping from 2 2 S to 2 2 S such that for all S ⊆ 2 S :
A special case of our selection function is the following single-choice selection function, which restricts the selection function γ to select at most one element of a set.
Definition 5.3 (Single-Choice Selection Function).
A single-choice selection function γ 1 for a set S is a mapping from 2 2 S to 2 2 S such that for all S ⊆ 2 S :
We can now define partial meet revision for logic programs as the intersection of the selected compatible sets added to Q.
Definition 5.4 (Partial Meet Revision). Let P ∈ LP A and γ be a selection function for P. A partial meet revision operator * γ for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
We illustrate the revision operation by an example. In the examples throughout this article, we assume that the underlying language contains only the symbols that occur in the programs or that are otherwise mentioned explicitly.
The following theorem states which translated AGM revision postulates the revision operator * γ satisfies.
Theorem 5.1. The revision operator * γ satisfies ( * 1)-( * 6).
As in the classic case, to satisfy the supplementary revision postulates ( * 7)-( * 8), we would need to place further restrictions on the selection function.
Definition 5.5 (Relational Selection Function) . A transitively relational selection function γ for a set S is a selection function for S such that S ⊆ 2 S and:
Yet, even if we make these additional restrictions on a selection function γ for P, postulates ( * 7) and ( * 8) are not satisfied by * γ , as shown respectively in the next two examples. For legibility, we confine the examples to abstract notation. Corresponding canonical logic programs can be constructed via the method provided by Eiter et al. (2013) .
For illustration, we show for this example how to construct some canonical programs. (a, ab) , (b, ab) 
Our partial meet revision operator does not satisfy the entire set of AGM revision postulates, only the subset of basic postulates ( * 1)-( * 6). This stands in contrast to the result in classical logics, according to which any partial meet revision operator is characterised by the set of basic and supplementary revision postulates. However, that result holds for logically closed belief sets, and the logic programs we investigate here are not logically closed. When we consider our partial meet revision operator * γ in the light of the belief base framework, which targets belief states that are not necessarily closed under logical consequence, we obtain the following representation theorem.
Theorem 5.2. An operator * γ is a partial meet revision operator for P ∈ LP A determined by a selection function γ for P iff * γ satisfies ( * 1b)-( * 5b).
Returning to our motivation, we now give some formal examples to highlight the drawbacks of the distance-based revision operator and then show how our partial meet operator addresses these. Recall that the distance-based revision operator does not specify the structure of the revised program. For convenience, we provide a possible program that corresponds to the revision outcome for each example below, which we denote by P Q. {(a, a) , (a, ab) , (ab, ab)},
Examples (1) and (2) demonstrate that the revision operator does not satisfy the support property. In Example (1), the initial belief state expressed by program P consists of a and b. In fact, the second rule in P says that we believe b if we believe a. After revising by the program Q, which simply states that we do not believe a, we still believe b even though the reason to believe b is not given any more. The explanation for this is that the revision operator acts on a program-level, not on a rule-level, as it considers just the SE models of the program in its entirety. However, the dependency of b on a is not captured by the SE models of the program, only by the SE models of the second rule. Therefore, b is treated as an independent fact during the revision process. The situation is similar in Example (2). Here, we initially believe b due to the absence of belief a. After the revision, we continue to believe b even though the grounds for b do not exist any more.
Examples (3) and (4) demonstrate that the revision operator does not satisfy the preservation property. In Example (3), according to our initial belief state expressed by program P, we believe b whenever we believe a, but since we do not believe a currently, we are indifferent with respect to b at the moment. After revising by program Q, which states that we now believe a, we are still indifferent with respect to b. In Example (4), we initially believe a and would believe b whenever we do not believe a or are indifferent with respect to a. After revising by Q, which carries the information that we do not believe a any longer, we are still indifferent with respect to b. In both examples, the revision operation effectively disregards the second rule in P. However, there is no justification for such behaviour, as the information in Q only conflicts with the first rule in P, so that the second rule in P can safely be retained and thus b should be derived in both examples. This behaviour is due to the fact that the set of SE models of P is exactly the set of SE models of the first rule. The second rule is invisible in the program-level view. Consequently, the revision operator returns a result as if P had consisted merely of the first rule.
Finally, Example (4) stands in stark contrast to Example (5), where the revision operation coincides with expansion. In Example (5), we are indifferent with respect to b initially and should believe b when we do not believe c or are indifferent with respect to c. The revising program Q contains information that c indeed does not hold. Thus, b is incorporated into the new belief state. Yet, Example (4) described a similar scenario in which b is not included in the resulting belief state, thereby showing a clear discrepancy to the behaviour of the revision operator in Example (5). Since the set of SE models of the first rule of P in Example (5) is not a subset of the set of SE models of the second rule, the latter is preserved during the revision operation. It becomes apparent from this comparison that some dependencies between atoms expressed in P are respected by the revision operator , while others are not.
We now show that our partial meet revision operator * γ addresses these shortcomings of the distance-based revision method. Below are the results of our partial meet revision operator for the five examples above. In each example, the result is independent of the choice of selection function.
( a) , (a, ab) , (ab, ab)},
In Examples (1) and (2), the partial meet revision operator preserves the dependency of b on a and not a, respectively. This is expressed on the syntactic level by the revised program P * γ Q and on the semantic level by SE(P * γ Q ). In Examples (3) and (4), our partial meet revision operator takes into account all rules in a program, even those that may be "invisible" from a purely modelbased perspective, as shown by the respective revision outcomes. Finally, regarding Examples (4) and (5), our partial meet revision operator treats the dependency of b on not a and not c, respectively, in the same manner and adds b to the belief state uniformly in both examples. The reason for this behaviour is that our partial meet construction enables us to preserve information expressed on the rule-level by the individual rules in a program.
Revisiting our two real-life examples from the introduction, we can see that our partial meet revision operator returns the desired results. The first example ("fireworks") was formalised as Example (4) above, where a = f oд and b = f ireworks. Applying the revision operator * γ returns { ⊥ ← f oд., f ireworks ← not f oд. }, that is, it leaves us with the beliefs that there are fireworks unless it is foggy and that it will not be foggy, from which we can derive that the fireworks will be held. The second example ("101 or 280") was formalised as Example (1), where a = 101_roadworks and b = 280_quicker . Applying the revision operator * γ to this example returns { ⊥ ← 101_roadworks., 280_quicker ← 101_roadworks. }, that is, we believe that there are no roadworks on the 101 and that the 280 is quicker whenever there are roadworks on the 101, but not that the 280 is still the better choice.
We can formalise the properties of the partial meet revision operator with respect to support and preservation as follows.
Proposition 5.1. The partial meet revision operator * γ satisfies support.
Proposition 5.2. For any P, Q ∈ LP A , there exists a selection function γ so that the revision operator * γ satisfies preservation.
Our partial meet revision operator satisfies the support property fully, regardless of the choice of selection function. However, satisfaction of the preservation property depends on the choice of selection function. While each compatible set is subset-maximal and preserves as many rules of the initial program P as possible, the preserved rules may differ across the compatible sets and become lost once the intersection is applied on the selected compatible sets. It thus depends on the selection function, which of the preserved rules in the compatible sets are actually carried through to the revision outcome.
Regarding the screened semi-revision approach by Krümpelmann and Kern-Isberner (2012) (see Section 3), we can show that our partial meet revision operator * γ is a generalisation of their screened consolidation operator ! γ P . For any P, Q ∈ LP A with Q ⊆ P, let
and P! S E γ P Q = γ P (P⊥ S E ! Q ). Proposition 5.3. Let P, Q ∈ LP A . For any maxichoice selection function γ P for P, there exists a selection function γ for P such that (P ∪ Q )! S E γ P Q = P * γ Q. Conversely, if we translate our partial meet revision operator * γ to answer set semantics and restrict our selection function to be single-choice, then it will coincide with the screened consolidation operator ! γ P . Before we can do so, we need to translate our definition of compatible sets to answer set semantics. For any P, Q ∈ LP A , let
Definition 5.6 (Partial Meet Revision under Answer Set Semantics). Let P ∈ LP A and γ 1 be a single-choice selection function for P. A partial meet revision operator * AS γ 1 for P under answer set semantics is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
Proposition 5.4. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and γ 1 , γ P be single-choice and maxichoice selection functions, respectively, for P such that
Partial Meet Contraction
Having defined a revision operator, we now turn to the case of belief contraction. In line with classic belief change, the contraction of a program P by a program Q should eliminate from P all those beliefs from which Q can be derived. We use the complement of SE(Q ), denoted by SE (Q ) , to determine all maximal subsets of P that do not imply Q, called remainder sets.
Definition 5.7 (Remainder Set). Let P, Q ∈ LP A . The set of remainder sets of P with respect to Q is
Definition 5.8 (Partial Meet Contraction). Let P ∈ LP A and γ be a selection function for P. A partial meet contraction operator .
− γ for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
The following example demonstrates the contraction operation.
, for any selection function γ , and thus we obtain P .
The next theorem lists the translated AGM contraction postulates that are fulfilled by . − γ .
Theorem 5.3. The contraction operator . − γ satisfies ( . −1)-( . −4) and ( . −6).
It is easy to see from Example 5.4 above that . − γ does indeed not satisfy ( . −5). This is not surprising, since ( . −5) is generally not satisfied by operators on belief states that are not logically closed (Hansson 1999), as is the case here for logic programs.
In the AGM framework, it is sufficient that the selection function γ is determined by a transitive relation so that satisfies ( 7). Here, we require the relation to be maximised as well to guarantee satisfaction of ( . −7). This is in line with the result for partial meet base contractions, which also require the underlying selection function to be determined by a maximised transitive relation to satisfy such a property (Hansson 1993). 
−8) is a minimal change condition for belief sets that are closed under logical consequence. Thus, as in the case of our revision operator earlier, our partial meet contraction operator for logic programs, which are not logically closed, does not properly align with the AGM framework. With respect to the belief base postulates though, the following representation theorem holds for the contraction operator .
− γ .
Theorem 5.5. An operator . − γ is a partial meet contraction operator for P ∈ LP A determined by a selection function γ for P iff .
− γ satisfies ( . −1b)-( . −4b).
Besides the representation theorem above via ( . −1b)-( . −4b), we have the following additional properties of .
− γ regarding the remaining belief base contraction postulates ( . −5b)-( . −8b).
Proposition 5.5. The contraction operator . − γ satisfies ( . −5b), ( . −6b), and ( . −8b).
The next example illustrates that . − γ does not satisfy ( . −7b). 
ENSCONCEMENT BELIEF CHANGE
In this section, we will introduce further belief revision and contraction operators for logic programs, which are based on an ordering over the beliefs contained in a program. We begin by defining an ensconcement relation for logic programs as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Ensconcement). Let P ∈ LP A . An ensconcement associated with P is any total preorder on P that satisfies the following conditions:
( 1) For any r ∈ P: SE({ r ∈ P \ {r } | r r }) SE(r ), ( 2) For any r , r ∈ P: r r r if {r } ≡ s {r }.
Per this definition, an ensconcement associated with a logic program P is simply an ordering over the rules occurring in P. With P representing our entire set of beliefs, an ensconcement enables us to sort rules of P, which form our individual beliefs, hierarchically by their epistemic importance, or in other words, by how willing we are to give up one belief over another. Informally, r ≺ r means that the beliefs represented by r are more important to us than the beliefs represented by r . Fig. 1. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 of Example 6.2.
Condition ( 1) states that the set of SE models of any rule or combination of rules at least as ensconced as a given rule r may not be a proper subset of the set of SE models of r . Condition ( 2) requires that strongly equivalent rules are equally ensconced. Condition ( 1) is formulated slightly stronger than Condition ( 1) (see Section 2.2) from the original definition (Williams 1994) . Condition ( 1) allows a sentence ψ , that implies a sentence ϕ without being equivalent to ϕ, to be placed on the same ensconcement level as ϕ. In contrast, Condition ( 1) prohibits strict implication on the same ensconcement level. For instance, given rules a., a ← b., and a; b. contained in some program, both a ← b. and a; b. must be strictly more ensconced than a. according to Condition ( 1), whereas in a direct adaptation of Condition ( 1) at least one of the two rules a ← b. and a; b. would have to be equally ensconced as a.. The merit of this additional restriction will become evident shortly, when we show some examples of applying an ensconcement to perform revision operations in Section 6.1. The idea behind Condition ( 2) of the original definition is that any tautologies must be most ensconced, a requirement that is automatically captured in our Condition ( 1). Figure 1 shows all possible ensconcements associated with P, with rules displayed at the top being more ensconced than rules at the bottom.
Using the concept of logic program ensconcements, we now go on to define logic program revision and contraction operators and investigate their properties.
Ensconcement Revision
During a revision operation, new information from a program Q is added to an initial belief state in the form of a program P, and some beliefs from P have to be given up to achieve a consistent outcome. When the beliefs in P are ordered by an ensconcement, we can introduce the notion of a cut to determine the specific level in the ensconcement where all beliefs on and above this level are consistent with the revising program. Since an ensconcement associated with P is a relation over all rules of P, when we write r r , we implicitly mean r ∈ P and r ∈ P. Definition 6.2 (Cut). Let P, Q ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P. The (proper) cut of P for Q, written cut (Q ) , is defined as
Some interesting properties of the cut are listed below. Lemma 6.1. Let P, Q, R ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P.
A cut is the principal element for the following definition of an ensconcement revision operator. Definition 6.3 (Ensconcement Revision). Let P ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P. An ensconcement revision operator * for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
The revision operator * retains all elements of the cut. This is an obvious requirement, since the cut contains our most firmly held beliefs, which are entirely consistent with Q. In addition, any rule of P not in the cut that shares the same SE models with Q as the cut is retained as well. The example below illustrates the operation. Example 6.2. Consider again P from Example 6.1. Let Q = { ⊥ ← b. }. We then have the following results:
In Example 6.2, the belief expressed by the combination of rules { a. } and { b ← a. } is inconsistent with the new information { ⊥ ← b. }. Thus, at least one of these two rules must be discarded to reach a consistent belief state, while the rule { a ← b. } can be safely retained. The example shows that the revision operator * indeed retains { a ← b. } in all cases and discards one or both other rules depending on their ensconcement level. Whenever { b ← a. } is more ensconced than { a. }, the latter is discarded and vice versa. Only when both rules are equally ensconced, that is, when we cannot make up our mind which of the two beliefs we hold more firmly, the revision operator discards both.
We can see from the definition of * that the set of SE models of P * Q is exactly the set of SE models that are shared by cut (Q ) and Q. Proposition 6.1. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P. Then, SE(P * Q ) = SE(cut (Q ) + Q ).
The next theorem states which of the adapted AGM revision postulates the revision operator * satisfies. Theorem 6.1. The revision operator * satisfies ( * 1)-( * 6) and ( * 8).
The revision operator * does not satisfy ( * 7), as shown in the next example. 
Even though ensconcement revision was originally defined for belief bases, our ensconcement revision operator * satisfies the majority of AGM revision postulates for belief sets. Our operator does not satisfy any of the postulates that are unique to the belief base framework, as stated in the next theorem. Theorem 6.2. The revision operator * satisfies ( * 1b), ( * 2b), and ( * 5b).
In the following two examples, we illustrate that * does indeed not satisfy ( * 3b) and ( * 4b), respectively. is an ensconcement associated with P such that r 1 r 2 r 1 ≺ r 3 , then cut (Q ) = {r 3 } and P * Q = {r 3 } + Q. While r 2 ∈ P \ (P * Q ), there exists no program P such that P * Q ⊆ P ⊆ P + Q and P is satisfiable but P ∪ {r 2 } is not satisfiable. If is an ensconcement associated with P such that r 1 r 2 r 1 ≺ r 3 , then it holds for any P ⊆ P that P + Q is satisfiable iff P + R is satisfiable. However, we have cut (Q ) = {r 3 } and P ∩ (P * Q ) = {r 3 }, while cut (R) = {r 3 } and P ∩ (P * R) = {r 2 , r 3 }.
We will now examine the behaviour of our ensconcement revision operator with respect to the set of five examples from Section 5.1. In each example, the revision outcome is independent of the possible ensconcements that can be associated with P: {(a, a) , (a, ab) , (ab, ab)},
For all five examples, the ensconcement revision operator * returns the same desired results as the partial meet revision operator * γ . Examining in particular Examples (3) and (4), it now becomes evident why we diverted in our formulation of Condition ( 1) from the classic definition. Condition ( 1) prohibits strict implication on the same ensconcement level. Without this refined requirement, for Example (3), we could construct an ensconcement associated with P such that ⊥ ← a. b ← a. ⊥ ← a., which would give us the outcome P * Q = { a. }. For Example (4), we could construct an ensconcement associated with P such that a. b ← not a. a., which would lead to the outcome P * Q = { ⊥ ← a. }. These revision outcomes would correspond exactly to the undesired results of the distance-based revision operator , which we set out to avoid, because they disrespect the preservation property.
We can formalise the properties of the ensconcement revision operator with respect to support and preservation as follows.
Proposition 6.2. The ensconcement revision operator * satisfies support. Proposition 6.3. For any P, Q ∈ LP A , there exists an ensconcement so that the revision operator * satisfies preservation.
Similar to partial meet revision, our ensconcement revision operator satisfies the support property but the preservation property only in certain cases, depending on the ensconcement of rules.
In cases where rules that could be preserved are less ensconced than elements of the cut, these rules may not be preserved. While our formulation of Condition ( 1) somewhat mitigates such situations, it cannot prevent them entirely.
Ensconcement Contraction
We now use the concept of an ensconcement to present another contraction operator for logic programs. Analogous to revision, we first define for some P, Q ∈ LP A and an ensconcement associated with P that
Some useful properties of cut − (Q ) are listed here.
Definition 6.4 (Ensconcement Contraction). Let P ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P. An ensconcement contraction operator .
− for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
The contraction operator .
− works in a dual way to the revision operator * . It relies on cut − (Q ) to determine from which level upward in the ensconcement associated with P elements are retained in the operation, and adds any further parts of P that do not compromise the set of SE models of cut − (Q ) inconsistent with Q.
We can formalise the relationship between the SE models of P . − Q and cut − (Q ) as follows.
Proposition 6.4. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and be an ensconcement associated with P. Then, SE(P .
The contraction operator .
− satisfies all AGM contraction postulates except Recovery.
Theorem 6.3. The contraction operator . − satisfies ( . −1)-( . −4) and ( . −6)-( . −8).
The next example shows why . − does not satisfy the Recovery postulate ( . −5).
Example 6.6. Consider again P and Q from Example 5.4. For any ensconcement associated with P, it holds that P .
The main reason for non-satisfaction of Recovery is that our ensconcement contraction operator . − operates on programs that are not logically closed, and Recovery is a key AGM postulate that characterises contractions of logically closed belief sets. However, our ensconcement contraction operator satisfies the same set of belief base postulates as its classic counterpart.
Theorem 6.4. The contraction operator .
− satisfies (−1b), (−2b) and (−5b)-(−8b). 
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS
Having defined partial meet revision and contraction operators and ensconcement revision and contraction operators in the previous sections, we now establish the formal connections between them. We first relate partial meet revision to ensconcement revision and partial meet contraction to ensconcement contraction. We then investigate whether the granularity of ensconcements, that is, whether an ensconcement is defined over rules or subsets of a program, influences that relationship. Finally, we connect partial meet revision to partial meet contraction and ensconcement revision to ensconcement contraction via the Levi and Harper identities.
Relating Partial Meet Operators to Ensconcement Operators
We already saw from the set of postulates that * and * γ satisfy, that partial meet revision and ensconcement revision share similar properties. In the following characterisation theorem, we state the exact relationship between the two.
Theorem 7.1. Let P, Q ∈ LP A . For any selection function γ , there exists an ensconcement associated with P such that P * γ Q = P * Q.
Theorem 7.1 asserts that * γ can be characterised in terms of * . The other direction is not possible, as shown in the example below. 
On the one hand, the requirement SE(cut (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(R) in Definition 6.3 requires any subset R of P that is not part of the cut to have all SE models shared by the cut and Q, to be included in the revision outcome. In the previous example, the SE models shared by the cut and  Q are (c, c) , (c, bc) , and (bc, bc). Since (c, c) SE({ b. }) (and also (c, bc) 
On the other hand, the definition of partial meet revision is based on compatible sets, which are required to be maximal and to share only a minimum of one SE model with Q (Definition 5.1). This requirement limits the result of a partial meet revision for this example to the one above, regardless of the the type of selection function employed.
We also find that the partial meet contraction operator .
− γ can be characterised in terms of the ensconcement contraction operator .
− , formalised in the next theorem.
Theorem 7.2. Let P, Q ∈ LP A . For any selection function γ , there exists an ensconcement associated with P such that P .
The other direction of this theorem does not hold. Consider again P and from Example 7.1 and let Q = { a. }. It is easy to see that P .
− γ Q P . − Q, for any selection function γ .
Granularity of Ensconcements
For our partial meet construction, we determined the outcome of a revision or contraction operation by employing a function that selects among subsets of a program. For our ensconcement construction, we then used an ordering over individual rules of a program to select the rules to retain during a revision or contraction operation. Given the Characterisation Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 that hold only in one direction, it is worth investigating whether this difference in granularity, subsets or rules, plays a critical role in determining revision or contraction outcomes. To do so, we will now consider program subsets as the objects of change for our ensconcement revision and contraction operators. We begin with the definition of an ensconcement over subsets of a program.
Definition 7.1 (Ensconcement over Subsets). Given P ∈ LP A , a subset-ensconcement associated with P is any total preorder R on 2 P that satisfies the following conditions:
We define revision and contraction operators based on R as follows.
Definition 7.2 (Subset-Ensconcement Revision). Let P ∈ LP A and R be a subset-ensconcement associated with P. A subset-ensconcement revision operator * R for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
Definition 7.3 (Subset-Ensconcement Contraction). Let P ∈ LP A and R be a subsetensconcement associated with P. A subset-ensconcement contraction operator .
− R for P is defined such that for any Q ∈ LP A :
It turns out that it does not matter whether an ensconcement over subsets of a program or only over the individual rules is used to determine a revision or contraction outcome, provided that the individual rules are ordered in the same way in both ensconcements, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.3. Let P, Q ∈ LP A , be an ensconcement associated with P, and R a subsetensconcement associated with P such that {r } R {r } iff r r for all r , r ∈ P. Then, P * Q = P * R Q (or P . − Q = P . − R Q, alternatively). Table 1 . AGM Revision Postulates Satisfied by * γ and * ( * 1) ( * 2) ( * 3) ( * 4) ( * 5) ( * 6) ( * 7) ( * 8) * γ *
Relating Revision Operators to Contraction Operators
We now formalise the connection between partial meet revision and partial meet contraction with the help of the Levi and Harper identities as given in Definition 4.1.
Proposition 7.1. Let P ∈ LP A , γ be a selection function for P, and let * be an operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LP A : P * Q = (P . − γ Q ) + Q. Then, P * Q = P * γ Q.
Proposition 7.2. Let P ∈ LP A , γ be a selection function for P, and let . − be an operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LP A : P .
The characterisation via Levi and Harper identities also holds for ensconcement revision and ensconcement contraction. Proposition 7.3. Let P ∈ LP A , be an ensconcement associated with P, and let * be an operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LP A : P * Q = (P . − Q ) + Q. Then, P * Q = P * Q.
Proposition 7.4. Let P ∈ LP A , be an ensconcement associated with P, and let . − be an operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LP A : P .
DISCUSSION
From our investigations in the previous sections, we can extract two main findings. First, the belief change operators for logic programs that we proposed here are able to address the unintuitive behaviour of the distance-based approach. The latter takes a holistic, program-level view on logic programs and their revisions, by assuming a belief state to be the set of SE models of the entire program. Due to its focus on the program-level, the distance-based approach neglects information about relationships between atoms that is only captured on the rule-level, by the individual rules of a program, and therefore violates the properties of preservation and support. For our approach, we adapted partial meet and ensconcement constructions, which allowed us to define operators that are more sensitive with respect to the information expressed by the individual rules of a program. In particular, we considered the rules of a program in their syntactic form as a belief state and thus as the objects of change, which made it possible to preserve necessary information on the syntactic level during a change operation. This characteristic turned out to be a key step towards satisfying the preservation and support properties. It should be noted, however, that our operators are still model-based and not purely syntactic operators. Our operators rely on satisfaction defined under SE model semantics to determine compatible sets, remainder sets, ensconcements, and cuts, not on syntactic transformations of program components. Rather, our operators bridge the gap between purely semantic and purely syntactic methods, which is why we call them syntax-preserving.
Second, we found that our operators fit properly into the belief base framework for belief change. Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide an overview of the postulates that are satisfied by each operator. Our partial meet revision operator * γ satisfies all basic AGM revision postulates ( * 1)-( * 6). However, the partial meet revision operator does not satisfy the supplementary postulates ( * 7)-( * 8), even with further restrictions on the selection function, which allow operators under propositional logic to satisfy the supplementary postulates. A similar situation exists for our partial meet contraction However, evaluating our partial meet revision and contraction operators with respect to the belief base postulates showed that they exhibit the same characteristics as the partial meet base revision and contraction operators for propositional logic (Hansson 1993) . The partial meet revision operator is represented by ( * 1b)-( * 5b) (Theorem 5.2) and the partial meet contraction operator by ( . −1b)-( . −4b) (Theorem 5.5), and thus both operators fit neatly into the belief base framework. Our ensconcement revision operator .
− satisfies the same basic AGM postulates ( * 1)-( * 6) as our partial meet revision operator and in addition ( * 8) but also disrespects ( * 7). Our ensconcement contraction operator .
− satisfies all AGM postulates ( . −1)-( . −8) with the exception of ( . −5). Since an ensconcement-based construction is essentially geared towards belief bases (Williams 1994) , our ensconcement operators should align well with the belief base framework. Indeed, our ensconcement contraction operator .
− satisfies the same set of belief base postulates as its counterpart for propositional logic (Fermé et al. 2008) , that is, ( . −1b), ( . −2b), and ( . −5b)-( . −8b). As the classic belief base revision postulates ( 1)-( 5) have originally been proposed to characterise partial meet base revision operations, their applicability to characterise ensconcement revision operations is limited. It would be interesting for future work to define a set of belief base revision postulates that can exactly characterise ensconcement revision operations. Until then, we can use our adaptation of the Harper identity to show that any ensconcement contraction operator determined by our ensconcement revision operator * satisfies ( . −1b), ( . −2b), and ( . −5b)-( . −8b). It is now left to examine how our operators compare to the distance-based operator in terms of the AGM and belief base postulates. Tables 5 and 6 display the postulates satisfied by the distance-based operator . We can see that both our partial meet revision operator * γ and our ensconcement revision operator * are better behaved than on the scale of AGM postulates as well as on the scale of belief base postulates. It should be noted, however, that satisfies ( * 4m), which has a stricter antecedent than ( * 6), but neither * γ nor * satisfies ( * 4m).
CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented two new constructions of belief change in logic programs. Our specific aim was to overcome the drawbacks of existing semantic revision operators, namely, that they do not satisfy the properties of support and preservation. These are fundamental properties for a logic program belief change operator to return intuitive results. For this purpose, we chose to adapt partial meet and ensconcement constructions from classic belief change, which allowed us to define syntax-preserving belief change operators for logic programs that satisfy support and preservation, the latter depending on the choice of preferred rules in the initial program.
Our approach is novel in that the partial meet and ensconcement constructions not only enabled our operators to preserve more information from a logic program during a change operation than purely semantic operators, but they also facilitated natural definitions of contraction operators for logic programs, the first in the field to the best of our knowledge.
To evaluate the rationality of our operators, we translated the revision and contraction postulates from the classic AGM and belief base frameworks to logic programs. We established that our operators fit properly within the belief base framework and showed their interdefinability. We also demonstrated that our operators align more closely to the AGM and belief base frameworks than the distance-based revision operators and that they generalise the screened semi-revision operator.
While our partial meet and ensconcement operators specify how a program changes during a revision or contraction operation, they do not specify how the associated selection function or ensconcement relation changes. A selection function or ensconcement is associated with a program before the change operation. During the change operation, some rules may be discarded from the program and some new rules may be added to it in the case of revision, and any effects on the initial selection function or ensconcement or entrenchment should be taken into consideration. Such an extension to our approach would be worthwhile to pursue in the future. Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A . Assume there exists r ∈ (P ∩ Q ) \ ( γ (P Q )). Then, there exists
APPENDIX: PROOFS
. This is a contradiction, because R is maximal by Definition 5.1.
Proof. We first show that a partial meet revision operator * γ for P determined by a given selection function γ for P satisfies ( * 1b)-( * 5b).
( * 1b): Since ( * 1b) = ( * 2) and * γ satisfies ( * 2), * γ also satisfies ( * 1b). ( * 2b): Since ( * 2b) = ( * 3) and * γ satisfies ( * 3), * γ also satisfies ( * 2b). ( * 3b): Let r ∈ P. Assume that for all P with P * γ Q ⊆ P ⊂ P + Q and P being satisfiable, it holds that P ∪ {r } is satisfiable. In particular, for each R ∈ P Q with P * γ Q ⊆ R ∪ Q, this implies R ∪ Q ∪ {r } is satisfiable. As each R is subset-maximal, it follows that r ∈ R and thus r ∈ γ (P Q ). From Definition 5.4, we can then conclude r P \ (P * γ Q ). ( * 4b): For all P ⊆ P, let P + Q be satisfiable iff P + R is satisfiable. Then, P Q = P R by Definition 5.1 and so γ (P Q ) = γ (P R ) as well as P ∩ γ (P Q ) = P ∩ γ (P R ). By Lemma A.1, we obtain (P ∩ γ (P Q )) ∪ (P ∩ Q ) = (P ∩ γ (P R )) ∪ (P ∩ R). This means P ∩ ( γ (P Q ) ∪ Q ) = P ∩ ( γ (P R ) ∪ R). Thus, P ∩ (P * γ Q ) = P ∩ (P * γ R). ( * 5b): If Q is satisfiable, then for any R ∈ P Q , R + Q is satisfiable, which implies P * γ Q is satisfiable.
We now show that any operator • γ for P satisfying ( * 1b)-( * 5b) is a partial meet revision operator for P determined by some selection function for P. We first find a selection function γ for P. Letγ be such that
We begin by showing that γ is a function. If P Q = P R , then P ∩ (P • γ Q ) = P ∩ (P • γ R) by ( * 4b). This means γ (P Q ) = γ (P R ) according to our definition of γ .
We next show that γ is a selection function. Clearly, γ (P Q ) ⊆ P Q by our definition of γ . If P Q ∅, then Q is satisfiable by Definition 5.1 and thus P • γ Q is satisfiable by ( * 5b). Since Q ⊆ P • γ Q by ( * 1b) and P • γ Q ⊆ P ∪ Q by ( * 2b), it follows that (P ∩ (P • γ Q )) ∪ Q is satisfiable. This means that there exists R ∈ P Q such that P ∩ (P • γ Q ) ⊆ R. From our definition of γ , we therefore obtain that γ (P Q ) ∅.
Finally, we show that • γ is a partial meet revision operator for P, that is,
Consider first the limiting case that Q is not satisfiable. If r ∈ P \ (P • γ Q ), then there exists P such that P • γ Q ⊆ P ⊂ P ∪ Q and P is satisfiable but P ∪ {r } is not satisfiable by ( * 3b). This is a contradiction, since Q ⊆ P by ( * 1b). Therefore, it holds for all r ∈ P that r ∈ P • γ Q, that is, P ⊆ P • γ Q. Since Q ⊆ P • γ Q by ( * 1b) and P • γ Q ⊆ P ∪ Q by ( * 2b), we can conclude P • γ Q = P ∪ Q.
Assume now that Q is satisfiable. Let r ∈ P \ (P • γ Q ). If P Q = ∅, then it follows from ( * 1b) and ( * 3b) that P • γ Q = Q. Since γ (P Q ) = ∅ by our definition of γ , we thus have P • γ Q = Q = γ (P Q ) ∪ Q. If P Q ∅, then it follows directly from our definition of γ that P ∩ (P • γ Q ) ⊆ γ (P Q ). From ( * 1b) and ( * 2b), we then obtain P • γ Q ⊆ γ (P Q ) ∪ Q. To show the converse inclusion, first assume the case that P ∪ Q is satisfiable. This implies that for any P ⊆ P ∪ Q it holds that P is satisfiable. Applying ( * 3b), we obtain P \ (P • γ Q ) = ∅ and thus P ⊆ P • γ Q. From ( * 1b) and ( * 2b) it follows that P • γ Q = P ∪ Q. Moreover, due to the assumption that P ∪ Q is satisfiable and Definition 5.1, we have P Q = {P }. By our definition of γ , we obtain γ (P Q ) = {P } and thus γ (P Q ) = P and can conclude P • γ Q = γ (P Q ) ∪ Q. Last, assume the case that P ∪ Q is not satisfiable. We will show that r P • γ Q implies r γ (P Q ) ∪ Q. If r P, then r (P • γ Q ) \ Q by ( * 1b) and ( * 2b) and r γ (P Q ) by Definition 5.1. Since r P • γ Q implies r Q by ( * 1b), it fol-
According to ( * 3b), then there exists P such that P • γ Q ⊆ P ⊂ P ∪ Q and P is satisfiable but P ∪ {r } is not satisfiable. This means that there exists R ∈ P Q such that P ∩ P ⊆ R and r R. Since P ∩ (P • γ Q ) ⊆ P ∩ P ⊆ R, we obtain from our definition of γ that R ∈ γ (P Q ). We can thus conclude from r R that r γ (P Q ).
Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A , γ 1 be a single-choice selection function, and a ∈ Y \ X with (X , Y ) ∈ SE(P * γ 1 Q ) and X ⊂ Y . Thus, X |= (P * γ 1 Q ) Y . This means there is no rule r ∈ P * γ 1 Q such that
This would imply r ∈ R for R ∈ γ (P Q ), as R is subset-maximal by Definition 5.1, and thus r ∈ P * γ 1 Q, a contradiction. Proposition 5.3. Let P, Q ∈ LP A . For any maxichoice selection function γ P for P, there exists a selection function γ for P such that (P ∪ Q )! S E γ P Q = P * γ Q. Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and γ P be a maxichoice selection function for P. We will prove by cases.
Case 1: Q is not satisfiable. This means 
Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and γ 1 , γ P be single-choice and maxichoice selection functions, respectively, for P. Assume that γ 1 (2 P ) ∪ Q = γ P ({ R ∪ Q | R ∈ 2 P }) for any γ P . We will prove by cases.
Case 1 Proof. Let P, Q, R ∈ LP A . It follows from SE(Q + R) = SE(Q ) ∪ SE(R) and the definition of 
Proof. We first show that a partial meet contraction operator . − γ for P determined by a given selection function γ for P satisfies ( . −1b)-( . −4b).
( . −1b): Follows from ( . −1b) = ( . −2) and satisfaction of ( . −2). ( . −2b): Follows from ( . −2b) = ( . −4) and satisfaction of ( . −4). ( . −3b): Let r ∈ P. Assume that for all P with P .
− γ Q ⊆ P ⊂ P and P |= s Q, it holds that P ∪ {r } |= s Q. In particular, for each
As each R is subset-maximal by Definition 5.7, it follows that r ∈ R and thus r ∈ P .
We now show that any operator • γ for P satisfying ( . −1b)-( . −4b) is a partial meet contraction operator for P determined by some selection function for P. We first find a selection function γ for P. Let γ be such that
We begin by showing that γ is a function.
From our definition of γ , we therefore obtain that γ (P − Q ) ∅. Finally, we show that • γ is a partial meet contraction operator for P, that is, 3b) . This is a contradiction, since |= s Q. Therefore, it holds for all r ∈ P that r ∈ P • γ Q, that is, P ⊆ P • γ Q.
Since P • γ Q ⊆ P by ( . −1b), we can conclude P • γ Q = P. Assume now that |= s Q. Let r ∈ P \ (P • γ Q ). If P − Q = ∅, then it follows from ( . −2b) and ( . −3b) that P • γ Q = ∅. Since γ (P − Q ) = ∅ by our definition of γ , we thus have P • γ Q = γ (P − Q ). If P − Q ∅, then it follows directly from our definition of γ that P • γ Q ⊆ γ (P − Q ). To show the converse inclusion, first assume the case that P |= s Q. This implies that for any P ⊆ P it holds that P |= s Q. Applying ( . −3b), we obtain P \ (P • γ Q ) = ∅ and thus P ⊆ P • γ Q. From ( . −1b) it follows that P • γ Q = P. Moreover, due to the assumption that P |= s Q and Definition 5.7, we have P − Q = {P }. By our definition of γ , we obtain γ (P − Q ) = {P } and thus γ (P − Q ) = P and can conclude P • γ Q = γ (P − Q ). Last, assume the case that P |= s Q. We will show that r P • γ Q implies r γ (P − Q ). If r P, then r P • γ Q by ( . −1b) and r γ (P − Q ) by Definition 5.7. Now assume r ∈ P \ (P • γ Q ). According to ( . −3b), then there exists P such that P • γ Q ⊆ P ⊂ P and P |= s Q but P ∪ {r } |= s Q. This means that there exists R ∈ P − Q such that P ⊆ R and r R. Since P • γ Q ⊆ P ⊆ R, we obtain from our definition of γ that R ∈ γ (P − Q ). We can thus conclude from r R that r γ (P − Q ). Proposition 5.5. The contraction operator .
− γ satisfies ( . −5b), ( . −6b), and ( . −8b).
Proof.
( . − (Q + R) = P by Definition 6.4 and |= s Q and |= s R, which means P .
− Q = P and P . − R = P by Definition 6.4. Now let |= s Q + R. We proceed by cases.
Case 1: cut − (Q ) |= s R. Then, cut − (Q + R) = cut − (Q ) by Lemma 6.2 (f). Let r ∈ P . − (Q + R). This means r ∈ P by ( .
−2) and SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q + R) ⊆ SE(r ) by Definition 6.4. It follows that SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ). Due to the case assumption, we obtain SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ) and thus r ∈ P . − Q by Definition 6.4. Now let r ∈ P . − Q. This means r ∈ P by ( . −2) and SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ) by Definition 6.4. Then, SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ) due to the case assumption. It also follows from the case assumption that SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE(R) = ∅ and SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(R) = ∅. We thus have SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ (SE(Q ) ∪ SE(R)) ⊆ SE(r ), that is, SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q + R) ⊆ SE(r ). Therefore, r ∈ P .
− γ (Q + R) by Definition 6.4. Case 2: cut − (R) |= s Q. Follows analogous to Case 1 so that P .
− (Q + R) = P . − R. Case 3: cut − (Q ) |= s R and cut − (R) |= s Q. Then, cut − (Q + R) = cut − (Q ) = cut − (R) by Lemma 6.2 (g) . Let r ∈ P .
− (Q + R). This means r ∈ P by ( . −2) and SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q + R) ⊆ SE(r ) by Definition 6.4. We thus have SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ) and SE(cut − (Q + R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r ). From the case assumption it follows that SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ) and SE(cut − (R)) ∩ SE(R) ⊆ SE(r ). This means r ∈ P . − Q and r ∈ P . − R by Definition 6.4 and therefore r ∈ (P . SE(r ) . By Proposition 6.4, SE(P . − Q ) ∩ SE(Q ) = SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE (Q ) , so that we obtain SE(cut − (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ). This implies r ∈ P . − γ Q by Definition 6.4. We can conclude r ∈ P by ( . −2).
Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A and γ be a selection function that determines the outcome of P * γ Q. By S = (P * γ Q ) ∩ P = γ (P Q ), we denote the subset of P that is retained in the revision and by S = P \ S the subset of P that is discarded. We can then create an ensconcement associated with P that has a minimal number of levels, such that for all r ∈ S and for all r ∈ S : r ≺ r . We now show that (P * Q ) ∩ P = S. Clearly, cut (Q ) = S by Definition 6.2, which implies S ⊆ (P * Q ) ∩ P. Assume that there exists an r ∈ S with SE(cut (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE(r ). Then, for each selected compatible set R ∈ γ (P Q ), it would hold that r ∈ R, because R is maximal by the definition of P Q . Yet this implies r ∈ S, a contradiction.
− γ Q = P . − Q.
Proof. Follows analogously to the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Lemma A.4. Let R be a subset-ensconcement associated with some P ∈ LP A and R ⊆ P. For any rule r ∈ R, it holds that R R {r }.
Proof. Since R |= s {r }, it follows from Conditions ( R 1) and ( R 2) that {r } ⊀ R R.
Theorem 7.3. Let P, Q ∈ LP A , be an ensconcement associated with P, and R a subsetensconcement associated with P such that {r } R {r } iff r r for all r , r ∈ P. Then, P * Q = P * R Q (or P . − Q = P . − R Q, alternatively).
Proof. Let P, Q ∈ LP A , an ensconcement associated with P, and R a subset-ensconcement associated with P. Assume that {r } R {r } iff r r for all r , r ∈ P. From Lemma A.4 it is clear that cut (Q ) = cut R (Q ) , which implies for all r ∈ (P * Q ) \ Q : SE(cut R (Q )) ∩ SE(Q ) ⊆ SE({r }), and thus P * Q ⊆ P * R Q. Since SE(R) ⊆ SE(r ) for any R ⊆ P and each r ∈ R, we also have P * R Q ⊆ P * Q.
Analogous for contraction.
Proposition 7.1: Let P ∈ LP A , γ be a selection function for P, and let * be an operator for P such that for any Q ∈ LP A : P * Q = (P . 
